The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

The scientific bestseller by economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson is dedicated to the development of conceptual foundations for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. The authors start from an outwardly simple thesis that different social groups prefer different political institutions due to how they distribute political power and resources. Thus, democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens but opposed by the elites. However, dictatorship is unstable when citizens can pose a threat of public disorder and revolution. In response to this, when the cost of repression is significantly high and promises of concessions are not trustworthy, elites may be forced to create democracy. Through democratization, elites credibly transfer political power to citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites have no strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and scale of globalization.